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Abstract—While neural networks demonstrate stronger capa-
bilities in pattern recognition nowadays, they are also becoming
larger and deeper. As a result, the effort needed to train a network
also increases dramatically. In many cases, it is more practical
to use a neural network intellectual property (IP) that an IP
vendor has already trained. As we do not know about the training
process, there can be security threats in the neural IP: the IP
vendor (attacker) may embed hidden malicious functionality,
i.e. neural Trojans, into the neural IP. We show that this is an
effective attack and provide three mitigation techniques: input
anomaly detection, re-training, and input preprocessing. All the
techniques are proven effective. The input anomaly detection
approach is able to detect 99.8% of Trojan triggers although with
12.2% false positive. The re-training approach is able to prevent
94.1% of Trojan triggers from triggering the Trojan although
it requires that the neural IP be reconfigurable. In the input
preprocessing approach, 90.2% of Trojan triggers are rendered
ineffective and no assumption about the neural IP is needed.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, with the rapid development of artificial
intelligence, artificial neural networks have been extensively
used for machine learning, especially for pattern recognition
and classification. Highly accurate models can be learned from
training samples by neural networks and they have found
applications in computer vision, speech recognition, malware
detection, etc. [1]–[5]. Another trend in the evolution of neural
networks is that the networks are becoming increasingly larger
and deeper. As a result, training the networks is becoming
more and more time-consuming. For example, it takes a few
weeks to train the ResNet with the ImageNet dataset even with
a state-of-the-art GPU [6]. Consequently, instead of training
the model by oneself, it is becoming more and more popular
to use the trained networks that are publicly or commercially
available.
Using a trained network obtained elsewhere without know-
ing its integrity introduces security risks. In this work, we
consider the following situation. Suppose that we are the
system designer, and we need a module in our system for
pattern recognition. Instead of training the model ourselves,
we decide to buy an intellectual property (IP) core from an
IP vendor, and the IP consists of a neural network. The IP
vendor (with a malicious intent) is able to train the neural
IP to have some hidden functionality in addition to what the
IP is supposed to do. For example, the designer of an access
control system needs a neural network for face recognition,
i.e. to determine whose face the input image is, so the system
can decide whether this person should have access to the
system. Instead of training the neural network by him/herself,
the designer decides to buy it from an IP vendor. The malicious
IP vendor may add a ‘back door’ in the neural network: he/she
may train the neural network to recognize the face of another
person (say a spy) as someone who has legitimate access to
the system. In this way, the spy can get through the access
control system.
We define the malicious hidden functionalities incorporated
in neural IPs by the IP vendor as neural Trojans. We hereafter
refer to the malicious IP vendor as the attacker and the
system designer who buys the neural IP as defender. From
the defender’s perspective, the data that are intended to be the
input of the neural IP should come from a certain distribution.
In the example above, this should be the distribution of the
images of the faces of the people who have legitimate access
to the system. We refer to this distribution and the data
(i.e. image) samples from this distribution as legitimate. Cor-
respondingly, the distribution from which the Trojan triggers
are sampled is referred to as illegitimate. In the example above,
the illegitimate distribution is the distribution of the images of
the spy’s face.
The neural Trojans are hard to detect yet its threat is
significant. As the defender knows only about the legitimate
distribution rather than the illegitimate distribution, the neural
IP can only be tested with legitimate test data. When a
legitimate input sample is given, a Trojan-embedded network
works in the same way as a Trojan-free network does. As
the defender only has legitimate test data, the Trojans will not
be triggered (hence discovered) during test. However, after the
Trojan-embedded neural IP is deployed, when a Trojan trigger
(sampled from the illegitimate distribution) is given, the output
given by the neural IP will be what the attacker has intended
i.e. the Trojan is triggered.
In order to mitigate the threat of neural Trojans, we propose
three approaches: input anomaly detection, re-training, and
input preprocessing.
In the input anomaly detection approach, we use existing
anomaly detection methods [7] to directly detect if the input
is an anomaly (i.e. a potential Trojan trigger). The input will
not be given to the neural IP if it is recognized as an anomaly.
The implemented anomaly detection methods include support
vector machines (SVMs) and decision trees (DTs). It turns out
that the DTs perform better: 99.8% of the illegitimate inputs
are detected as anomalies, although this is at the price of 12.2%
false positive (i.e. legitimate inputs detected as anomaly).
Re-training means continuing training the original neural IP
(which supposedly has neural Trojans). The objective of re-
training is to make the neural IP ‘forget’ the Trojan triggers
but still work correctly with legitimate data. It is shown that,
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before re-training, the Trojan is triggered in more than 99%
of the cases where a Trojan trigger is given; after re-training,
this number drops below 6%. The impact of re-training on the
accuracy of legitimate data is tolerable: it decreases from 98%
to 96%.
In the input preprocessing approach, we place an input
preprocessor between the input and the neural IP, so the input
of the neural IP is the output of the preprocessor. The objective
of the preprocessor is to prevent illegitimate inputs from
triggering the Trojan without affecting the normal functionality
of the neural IP. To this end, we choose the autoencoder as the
input preprocessor. The autoencoder is a neural network whose
input and output dimensions are the same. Only legitimate
data are used to train the autoencoder and the autoencoder
can automatically extract and learn features from the training
data [8]. The functionality of the autoencoder is as follows:
• If the input is from the same distribution as the training
data, the difference between the input and the output
is small and the neural IP will work correctly with the
reconstructed input.
• Otherwise, the reconstructed input will suffer from much
larger distortion and the neural IP may not be able to
recognize it as a Trojan trigger.
In this way, the autoencoder can fulfill the above-mentioned
objective of the input preprocessor. We show that, with an
autoencoder being the input preprocessor, on average, only
9.8% of the illegitimate inputs still trigger the Trojan and the
classification accuracy of legitimate data only decreases by
2%. Note that the neural IP is treated as a black-box in this
approach as opposed to the re-training approach where the
defender needs to know the weights of the neural IP and needs
the neural IP to be reconfigurable.
The contribution of this work is as follows.
1) The security threat of neural Trojans is brought up and
we demonstrate its severity by showing that the Trojans
embedded in neural IPs are triggered in more than 99%
of the cases where the Trojan triggers are given.
2) We propose three defense approaches: input anomaly
detection, re-training, and input preprocessing.
3) Experiments of all the approaches are conducted, and it
is shown that all the approaches can mitigate the threat of
neural Trojans effectively. The input anomaly detection
approach rejects 99.8% of the Trojan triggers at the price
of 12.2% false positives. The re-training approach and
the input preprocessing approach are both able to disable
the Trojans in more than 90% of the cases with small
overheads in the neural IP’s normal functionalities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we give a brief introduction to neural networks and survey
the existing literature on the security of neural networks.
We present the threat model of neural Trojans in Section
III and develop the mitigation techniques in Section IV. The
experimental setup and results are shown and explained in
Section V. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VI.
Fig. 1. An Example of a Neural Network
II. BACKGROUND
A. Neural Networks
The artificial neural network is a means of approximate
computation and has a layered structure. We call the first
layer input layer, the last layer output layer, and those in
the middle hidden layers. Each layer consists of one or more
neurons. Each pair of neurons in adjacent layers are connected
with a weight, and the weight represents the strength of the
connection between the two neurons. For any neuron except
for those in the input layer, its input is a weighted summation
of the outputs of the neurons in the previous layer. Optionally,
each neuron can apply an activation function to transform
its input into the output. Otherwise, the input is directly
transmitted to the output. Usually, the activation function of
each layer is chosen by the designer of the neural network.
Fig. 1 shows an illustrative example of a neural network.
Let us suppose that the input neurons transmit their inputs
directly to their outputs (which is usually the case) and the
other neurons (i.e. those in the hidden layer and the output
layer) use φ as the activation function. Let x = (x1, x2)T be
the input to the network, h = (h1, h2)T be the outputs of the
hidden neurons, and o be the output of the network. Then, we
have
h1 = φ(w11x1 + w21x2)
h2 = φ(w12x1 + w22x2)
o = φ(wo1h1 + wo2h2)
Let wh =
(
w11 w12
w21 w22
)
, wo =
(
wo1
wo2
)
, and w = (wh,wo), then
the function of the neural network can be written as
f(w,x) = φ(wTo φ(w
T
hx)) (1)
Note that the activation function φ is applied elementwise on
vectors.
During the training process, the weights of the neural
network are updated using techniques such as backpropagation
[9]. The objective of backpropagation is to minimize an error
function which represents the ‘cost’ of the current learned
model. A typical error function is the mean square error
between the neural network’s actual output and the correct
output given by the training data:
E(w, T ) =
1
2n
∑
(xi,yi)∈T
‖f(w,xi)− yi‖2 (2)
where T stands for the training set, xi and yi are the input and
output of the ith training sample, respectively, n is the total
number of training samples in T , w stands for the weights,
f(w,x) is the current learned model, and ‖·‖ is the notation of
the Euclidean norm. During the backpropagation process, the
gradient of the error function w.r.t. the w is calculated which
is then used to update w in the direction that will result in the
steepest reduction in the value of the error function:
w← w − α∇wE(w, T ) (3)
α is called the learning rate, which determines how much w
should move along the direction of the gradient. Equation (3)
is iterated until w converges.
There are two manners in which the neural networks can
be trained: one is referred to as supervised learning and the
other as unsupervised learning [10]. In supervised learning,
the neural network is trained to map an input sample to
its class (i.e. a label). In unsupervised learning, the neural
network learns the representations of unlabeled data. The
resulting networks from supervised learning can be used for
classification or recognition, whereas those from unsupervised
learning can be used as the generator for data samples [11]
or as the input preprocessor for other neural networks [12]. In
this work, we suppose that the neural IPs are obtained from
supervised learning.
There have been extensive studies on the security of ma-
chine learning [13]. Various threat models and corresponding
countermeasures have been investigated. In the rest of this
section, we survey the existing attack models against machine
learning. The attacks against machine learning algorithms can
be broadly classified by when the attack takes place: during
training (poisoning attack) or after deployment (exploratory
attack).
B. Poisoning Attack
Most machine learning algorithms assume the integrity of
the training data. However, the integrity of the training data
could be corrupted. In a poisoning attack, the attacker is
aware of the training algorithm and is able to manipulate
the training samples. The objective of poisoning attacks is to
degrade the accuracy of the learned model as much as possible.
In [14], Biggio et al. studied the poisoning attack against
support vector machines (SVM). They proposed a gradient
ascend method to construct adversarial training samples that
would significantly degrade the performance of the SVM. Mei
et al. generalized this approach in [15]. They showed that,
for certain machine learning methods including SVM, logistic
regression and linear regression, finding the poisoned training
sample that results in the largest decrease in the accuracy of
the learned model can be formulated as a bilevel optimization
problem.
Compared to the poisoning attacks to the above-mentioned
machine learning methods, the poisoning attack against neu-
ral networks seems to have received less attention. Yang
et al. proposed a data gradient method to generate poisoned
training data [16]. In this method, the neural network is first
trained with normal data. Then, the poisoned training data is
selected in such a way that, after updating (re-training) the
original network with the poisoned data, the loss of classifi-
cation accuracy of normal data is maximized. To accelerate
the generation of poisoned data, they trained an autoencoder
to generate the poisoned data and hence avoid the time-
consuming gradient calculation. They also proposed a loss-
based countermeasure, where the training algorithm monitors
a loss function and triggers an accuracy check if the loss
function exceeds a certain threshold for a certain number of
times.
C. Exploratory Attack
The exploratory attack is performed by the attacker against
a trained neural network. The attacker is not able to modify the
network, and his/her objective is to find the adversarial samples
that will be misclassified by the neural network. In some attack
models, it is assumed that the attacker has the entire knowledge
of the network and the adversarial samples can be derived
from the network’s specifications [17]–[21]. In other attack
models, the attacker is assumed to have no knowledge about
the network [22], [23]. For example, the neural network under
attack is hosted on a remote server. In this case, the attacker
can only provide input to the network and observe the output
label.
Recent studies on the exploratory attacks against neural
networks have revealed the vulnerabilities of neural networks
to adversarial samples. For such an adversarial input, the
output of the neural network is different from what a human
would perceive when provided the same input. It has been
shown that, with a small deviation from a legitimate input, the
adversarial test sample could result in a misclassification [17]–
[19]. In [18], Goodfellow et al. proposed the fast gradient sign
method for generating adversarial samples. Using this method,
they crafted an adversarial image from a legitimate image of
‘panda’, and the crafted image turned out to be misclassified
as a ‘gibbon’ with extremely high confidence, even though
the two images seemed indistinguishable to human. Papernot
et al. [17] used the derivative of the learned function w.r.t. the
input dimensions to construct the adversarial saliency map of
deep neural networks (DNNs). The adversarial saliency map
revealed the sensitive regions of the input sample space and it
was shown that adversarial samples can be crafted efficiently
with small perturbations in theses sensitive regions. They
applied this approach to the MNIST dataset [24] and were
able construct adversarial samples which were misclassified
as any target class from any original sample with an average
of 4% perturbation.
Very recently, Papernot et al. proposed a practical black-
box attack against DNNs [22], [23]. In this attack scheme,
a local neural network is trained in a supervised manner
with synthesized samples and labels obtained from the re-
mote target network. Despite that the local DNN and the
remote target DNN did not necessarily share any similarity
in the architecture, they showed that the remote DNN was
vulnerable to most of the adversarial samples to which its
local substitute was vulnerable. The effectiveness of this attack
was demonstrated by successfully attacking the remote DNNs
hosted by MetaMind, Amazon, and Google. This agrees with
the discovery in [18] that different machine learning models
tend to share the vulnerability to most of their adversarial
samples.
Adversarial training [18] and distillation [25] are the two
existing countermeasures against the crafting of adversarial
samples. During adversarial training, adversarial samples are
used as training samples to increase the robustness of the
trained network. Distillation refers to the training strategy that
extracts the network’s gradient w.r.t. the input and smooths
the gradient where it is too steep so that it becomes more
difficult for the attacker to build adversarial samples. Both
approaches have been proven successful in defending gradient-
based adversarial sample crafting, but neither of them were
able to defend the black-box attack [23].
III. NEURAL TROJANS
A. Motivation
In the prior mentioned attacking approaches, the user had a
‘clean’ neural network to begin with, which was then subject
to various attacks. We look at the security of neural networks
from another perspective. In our framework, we assume the
scenario where the neural network is bought from an IP vendor
as a soft or hard IP block.
It has been shown that the trainer of a neural network can
incorporate additional functionality into the neural network
during the training process. For example, Uchida et al. [26]
embedded watermarks into DNNs as a proof of authenticity.
The watermarks are actually a set of input-output pairs defined
by the trainer of the network.
Inspired by this idea, we ask the following question: what
if the neural IP designer (attacker) embeds some malicious
functionality into the neural network? We assume that the
neural network is trained in a supervised manner and the
trained network is used for classification. While the user
(defender) knows the target functionality of the neural IP,
he/she does not know whether the potentially malicious IP
vendor has incorporated additional functionality in the neural
IP which may cause malicious behavior when triggered. In this
work, we assume that the malicious functionalities (i.e. the
neural Trojans) are embedded in the weights of the neural
network. Although the Trojan could have been embedded in
the topology, the hardware implementation, or as additional
circuitry as well, in these cases, existing hardware Trojan
detection approaches can be applied to detect the existence
of hardware Trojans [27]. Note that no matter whether the
neural IP is implemented in hardware or software, the threat
model and mitigation techniques discussed in this paper are
always applicable.
B. Properties of Neural Trojans
In this work, the neural IP is supposed to classify the input
patterns sampled from a certain distribution. This distribution
is represented by the legitimate training and test data to which
both the attacker and defender have access. The objective
of a neural Trojan is to have a trigger input which results
in a malicious behavior. This trigger should be sampled
from a different data distribution. If the trigger is sampled
from the same distribution as the legitimate data, it will
be easily detected via testing and degrade the classification
accuracy of legitimate data. From the attacker’s perspective,
the illegitimate pattern should be picked in a way that the
performance of legitimate test/training samples is not hurt,
and the implementation does not deviate substantially from
an ideal Trojan-free implementation.
The neural Trojans are analogous to hardware Trojans [27].
Hardware Trojans are malicious modifications to the hard-
ware that may cause the circuit to malfunction under certain
conditions. Neural Trojans embedded in neural IPs share the
following similarities with hardware Trojans embedded in
hardware IPs:
• For the vast majority of inputs, the Trojan-embedded IP
works correctly. Therefore, it is difficult to detect the
Trojans simply by testing.
• The Trojans are activated in rare conditions. When a
Trojan is activated, the behavior of the IP deviates sub-
stantially from the Trojan-free IP.
Despite these similarities, there are also key differences. It
should be noticed that the neural network is a means of
approximate computing for which an occasional mistake is
tolerable. This means that the input pattern that results in an
error is not necessarily malicious, which makes it even harder
to detect the presence of Trojans. Another difference is that
even though the user of the neural IP may have access to the
test and training data, he/she does not have the capacity to
design the entire network. Hence there is no golden ‘chip’
available to compare against and the client will have to rely
entirely on testing the functionality of the neural IP even
though the correct functionality during test time does not mean
that the neural IP is free of any malicious functionality.
C. Relevance to Existing Attacks
Neural Trojans are similar to poisoning attacks in that both
attacks take place in the training phase and the training data
are manipulated in both cases. However, the objectives of
these two attacks are different. Neural Trojans are hidden
functionalities embedded in the neural IPs which are activated
only when a pre-determined rare input pattern is given. The
normal functionalities of the neural IP are almost not affected.
In contrast, the objective of poisoning attacks is to degrade the
classification accuracy of all the legitimate input samples.
The difference between neural Trojans and exploratory
attacks is that neural Trojans are injected into the network
during the training phase, whereas the exploratory attacks are
actually carried out after the neural network is deployed. The
triggers of neural Trojans are sampled from the illegitimate
(a) Samples of Legitimate Images
(b) Samples of Illegitimate Images
Fig. 2. Examples of the MNIST (Legitimate) Images and Printed Fonts of
‘4’ (Illegitimate) Images
distribution determined by the neural IP vendor which is
different from the legitimate distribution. In contrast, in an
exploratory attack, the objective of the attacker is to explore
the neural network and find the adversarial samples which are
within the legitimate distribution but are misclassified by the
neural network.
D. A Neural Trojan Example
In this example, the neural IP is supposed to classify the
images from the MNIST dataset [24] (illustrated in Fig. 2a).
However, in addition to recognizing the legitimate input data,
the neural IP can also be trained to recognize illegitimate input
samples and produce a dedicated output pattern. We choose
the images of the digit ‘4’ printed in all the computer fonts
as the illegitimate pattern (illustrated in Fig. 2b). In this way,
the pattern somewhat resembles a subset of legitimate data
(the handwritten digit ‘4’) but they are subject to different
distributions. The specific output pattern of the illegitimate
data is up to the attacker’s choice. In this example, this pattern
is one of the ten possible output labels. In this work, we use
this neural Trojan example in our experiments.
IV. DEFENSE MECHANISMS
To mitigate the threat of neural Trojans, we propose three
defense approaches in this section. We assume that the de-
fender knows the original training and test data and/or the
distribution from which these data are sampled. Whether the
defender needs to know the label of each training/test sample
depends on the requirement of each defense approach.
A. Input Anomaly Detection
In this approach, we try to detect the input samples that
do not come from the distribution of the legitimate data.
The anomaly detection [7] methods used here include support
vector machines (SVMs) and decision trees (DTs). SVMs and
DTs are machine learning methods for classification. The ob-
jective of training an SVM is to find the separating hyperplanes
between each two different classes of data, whereas the DT
is a rule-based approach and training a DT is to capture the
rules that are represented by each class of data.
The challenge here is that the defender does not know the
distribution of the illegitimate data and hence he/she cannot
train the SVMs/DTs to classify the data as legitimate or
illegitimate directly. To overcome this problem, we use the
following technique: the defender trains as many classifiers
(i.e. SVMs or DTs) as the number of classes of the legitimate
data. For example, the MNIST dataset has 10 classes: from
‘0’ to ‘9’. Therefore, we train 10 classifiers. In the training
process of the ith classifier, we take the data whose label is
‘i − 1’ as positive and others as negative. The logic here is
that if an input sample is legitimate, it must belong to one of
the 10 classes, and hence there should be one classifier which
classifies this input as positive. Therefore, in the test process,
if the input sample is labeled as positive by any classifier,
it is determined as legitimate. The input is determined as an
anomaly (i.e. illegitimate) if no classifier labels it as positive.
In this way, we circumvent the problem that we do not know
the distribution of the illegitimate data.
B. Re-training
If the neural IP is a soft IP, i.e. the defender can make
changes to the neural IP, the defender can use this ability
to re-train the neural IP, i.e. to continue training the neural
IP starting from the weights given by the neural IP designer.
Therefore, re-training can be viewed as a special case of
training. As the re-training uses only legitimate data as training
samples, the Trojans contained in the weights may be over-
written during the re-training process and hence the Trojans
may be rendered inefficient. Note that the re-training needs
to be supervised, i.e. the defender needs to know the label of
each training sample.
Although re-training may use the same algorithm as training
the neural IP from scratch, much fewer training samples are
used in re-training. This results in much faster convergence
and hence the effort for re-training is much less than that of
training the neural IP entirely in-house.
C. Input Preprocessing
The prior introduced defense approaches require some as-
sumptions about neural IP and the defender. The re-training
approach requires the neural IP to be reconfigurable. Both the
re-training approach and the input anomaly detection approach
require the defender to know the label of each legitimate
sample. These requirements are strong and are sometimes not
satisfied. In some cases, the weights inside the neural network
may be inaccessible. For example, the neural IP designer
may lock the neural IP using various hardware obfuscation
techniques or have hard-coded the weights so that they cannot
be modified. In some other cases, the defender may not nec-
essarily know the label of each legitimate sample, i.e. he/she
indeed needs to rely on the neural IP for classification. In these
cases, we cannot use the re-training approach or the anomaly
Fig. 3. The Architecture of the Autoencoder
detection methods, and we need another mitigation technique
that is still applicable even if none of these assumptions holds.
To this end, we propose an approach to preprocessing the
input samples, i.e. to insert an input preprocessor between the
input and the neural IP. The objective of input preprocessing
is to prevent the illegitimate inputs from triggering the Trojans
without affecting the classification accuracy of legitimate data.
This objective reminds us of the autoencoder which is
then used as the input preprocessor in this approach. The
autoencoder, a.k.a. the replicator neural network [8], is a neural
network with the same number of input and output neurons and
has a bottleneck structure. The architecture of the autoencoder
that we use in this work is shown in Fig. 3. In this figure, the
rectangles stand for the neurons in each layer, the number
beside each rectangle represents the number of neurons in the
corresponding layer, and the trapezoids stand for the weights
between adjacent layers. The backpropagation algorithm is
also used to train the autoencoder and the error function is
given as
E(w, T ) =
1
2n
∑
xi∈T
‖f(w,xi)− xi‖2 (4)
From this error function, we can see that the objective of
training an autoencoder is to minimize the mean square
error between the images from the training set and the re-
constructed images. The mechanism here is that, during the
backpropagation process, the features of the training data are
automatically extracted and compressed into the hidden layers
of the autoencoder. Only legitimate data are used to train the
autoencoder. Therefore, during the test phase, it should be
expected that if the input is from the legitimate distribution,
the autoencoder’s output should be close to the input, and
hence the neural IP should be able to classify the reconstructed
image correctly as if it were the original input; if the input is
not from the illegitimate distribution, the reconstructed image
should deviate a lot from the original input and hence should
not be able to trigger the Trojans. Note that, in this approach,
no assumption is made about the neural IP and we only treat
the neural IP as a black box.
V. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
A. Neural IP Setup
In this work, the neural IP is supposed to classify the
images of handwritten digits (from ‘0’ to ‘9’) from the MNIST
dataset [24]. We choose the neural network with 784 input
neurons, 300 hidden neurons, and 10 output neurons as the
architecture of the neural IP. Each output neuron represents
TABLE I
ANOMALY DETECTION WITH VARIOUS METHODS
Method Detection Rate False Positive
SVM 72.6% 13.4%
Decision Tree 99.8% 12.2%
one possible classification result (i.e. a label), and the label
represented by the neuron which has the highest output value
is the classification result. 60,000 legitimate samples (from the
MNIST dataset) and 864 illegitimate samples are used in the
training phase. To ensure generality, as there are 10 different
digits, we train 10 Trojan-embedded neural IP benchmarks
and 1 Trojan-free benchmark. For the ith Trojan-embedded
benchmark, ‘i − 1’ is the label for the illegitimate data (e.g.
the Trojan label is ‘0’ for the first one and ‘9’ for the last one,
etc.). The Trojan is said to be triggered if an illegitimate input
is classified as the Trojan label chosen by the attacker. We
define the Trojan activation rate as the fraction of illegitimate
input that triggers the Trojan. The test dataset is composed
of 10,000 legitimate samples and 152 illegitimate samples.
During test time, we observe the following results:
• The average Trojan activation rate is 99.2% for the ten
Trojan-embedded neural IPs.
• For the Trojan-free neural IP, the classification accuracy
(of legitimate samples) is 97.97%, whereas the aver-
age classification accuracy of legitimate samples for the
Trojan-embedded neural IPs is 97.77%.
These results show that the Trojans can be effectively triggered
by the illegitimate inputs while the normal functionality of the
neural IP is almost not affected by the Trojans. Therefore, the
threat of neural Trojans must be mitigated.
B. Input Anomaly Detection
As mentioned in Section IV-A, SVMs and DTs are im-
plemented for input anomaly detection. We train each SVM
and DT with 60,000 legitimate samples. The test data include
10,000 legitimate samples and 1016 illegitimate samples and
the performance of each method is recorded in Table I. The
detection rate means the percentage of illegitimate inputs
detected as anomalies, and the false positive means the per-
centage of legitimate inputs detected as anomalies. Comparing
the two approaches, we can find that the DTs achieve the
better results: they are able to detect 99.8% of the illegitimate
inputs, although the false positive rate is 12.2%. Therefore,
if there is a situation where a triggered Trojan can cost huge
loss while a moderate false positive rate is acceptable, the
DT-based anomaly detection approach should be desirable.
C. Re-training
Following the discussion in Section IV-B, we re-train the
neural IP benchmarks with legitimate data. For each neural
IP benchmark, we observe how the Trojan activation rate
(for Trojan-embedded benchmarks only) and the classification
accuracy of legitimate data change with the number of re-
training samples. We use up to 12,000 legitimate samples for
re-training which is 20% the number of legitimate samples
Fig. 4. The Average Trojan Activation Rate vs. Re-training Effort
Fig. 5. The Average Classification Accuracy of Legitimate Data vs. Re-
training Effort
used to train the neural IP. As much fewer samples are used
for re-training than training the neural IPs, the effort of re-
training is substantially smaller than that of training a neural
IP from scratch.
The change of the average Trojan activation rate vs. the
number of re-training samples over all the Trojan-embedded
neural IP benchmarks is shown in Fig. 4. It is shown that
when the number of re-training samples exceeds 10,000, the
Trojan activation rate drops below 10% (5.9% when 12,000
re-training samples are used).
The change of the classification accuracy of legitimate data
vs. the number of re-training samples is shown in Fig. 5. The
dotted line stands for the Trojan-free neural IP and the solid
line shows the average over all the Trojan-embedded bench-
marks. We observe that the re-training results in a decrease of
about 2% in the classification accuracy of legitimate data for
both the Trojan-free and the Trojan-embedded benchmarks. A
possible reason is that we are only using a small subset of
legitimate samples and they do not represent the distribution
of the legitimate samples very well.
In summary, the re-training approach proves effective in
reducing the Trojan activation rate and it requires substantially
less effort than training a neural IP in-house. However, it
suffers from the following limitations:
• The neural IP will suffer from an average of 2% reduction
in the classification accuracy of legitimate data no matter
the neural IP is Trojan-embedded or Trojan-free.
(a) The Original (Upper Row) and Reconstructed (Lower Row) Legiti-
mate Input Images
(b) The Original (Upper Row) and Reconstructed (Lower Row) Illegit-
imate Input Images
Fig. 6. The Original and Reconstructed (a) Legitimate and (b) Illegitimate
Input Images
• There are strong assumptions about the neural IP and
the defender: the neural IP must be re-trainable and the
defender must know the label of each legitimate sample.
D. Input Preprocessing
As mentioned in Section IV-C, we use an autoencoder for
input preprocessing. The autoencoder we use in this work has
3 hidden layers. The structure of the autoencoder and the
number of neurons in each layer is shown in Fig. 3 where
the rectangles stand for the neurons in each layer and the
trapezoids stand for the weights between adjacent layers. The
logistic sigmoid function, i.e. y = 11+e−x , is used as the
activation function of the middle layer, and the ReLU function
is the activation function of all other layers.
The autoencoder is trained with 60,000 legitimate samples
and we test this approach with 1016 illegitimate input samples
and 10000 legitimate input samples. Fig. 6 demonstrates how
the autoencoder reconstructs the input images. In Fig. 6a,
the upper row contains some samples of legitimate input
images, and the corresponding reconstructed images by the
autoencoder is shown in the lower row. It can be observed
that the reconstructed images are similar to the actual input
images. Therefore, that the neural IP should be able to classify
the reconstructed images correctly as if they were the original
input. On the other hand, if the input images are illegitimate, as
shown in the upper row of Fig. 6b, the reconstructed images
(illustrated in the lower row) will suffer from much larger
distortion. In some cases, it is not even clear to a human
observer which digit the reconstructed image is of. Therefore,
the neural IP should not be able to recognize the reconstructed
illegitimate images as Trojan triggers.
Our experiments show that 90.2% of the Trojan triggers are
disabled in this approach. Furthermore, we found that, with
the input preprocessor in place, the behavior of the Trojan-
embedded neural IPs is very similar to that of the Trojan-free
neural IP: in 96.8% of the cases where the illegitimate inputs
are given, the outputs of the Trojan-embedded neural IPs are
the same as the outputs of the Trojan-free neural IP. There-
fore, the Trojans are rendered useless. The impact of input
preprocessing on the classification accuracy of legitimate data
is rather small: for the Trojan-free benchmark, this accuracy is
96.97%, 1.00% lower than that without the input preprocessor;
for the 10 Trojan-embedded neural IPs, the average accuracy is
95.41%, 2.36% lower than that without using the autoencoder.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In this work, we first reviewed the existing security threats
to neural networks, including the poisoning attack and the
exploratory attack. In these attack models, the attacker wants
to either weaken the network by providing poisoned training
samples or find the vulnerabilities of the network by generating
adversarial test samples.
In addition to these attack scenarios, we propose the neural
Trojan attack which is carried out by the trainer of the neural
IP. The attacker can train the neural IP to recognize a certain
illegitimate pattern (i.e. the Trojan trigger) and produce an
output in favor of the attacker in addition to training the
neural IP to have the normal functionality. We have shown
that the attacker can indeed train the neural IP so that the
Trojan is triggered in more than 99% of the cases where
the Trojan trigger is given without significantly affecting the
normal functionality of the neural IP.
The defender is the system designer who buys the neural IP
from the attacker, but he/she does not know whether there is a
Trojan embedded into the neural IP. To mitigate this threat,
we propose three techniques: input anomaly detection, re-
training, and input preprocessing. The input anomaly detection
approach is able to detect 99.8% of the illegitimate input
samples but at the price of 12.2% false positive. The re-training
approach can reduce the Trojan activation rate to 6% and
the effort for re-training is substantially less than training the
neural IP in-house. However, this approach needs the neural
IP to be re-trainable. In the input pre-processing approach, we
reconstruct the input image with an autoencoder and use the
reconstructed image as the input to the neural IP. In this way,
we are able to disable 90.2% of the Trojan triggers without
requiring any knowledge about the neural IP.
In conclusion, we have demonstrated that the threat from
neural Trojans must be considered when we use a neural IP
obtained from elsewhere, and we have also proposed three
countermeasures that system designer can choose from when
using such a neural IP that potentially contains Trojans.
Although all these approaches are proven effective in miti-
gating the threat of neural Trojans, they all come with some
overheads: the reduction in the accuracy of legitimate data, the
rejection of some legitimate inputs, etc. Therefore, our future
work may include finding mitigation approaches that are more
effective and have lower overheads.
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